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Track choice and socio­
economic origin : measuring and
explaining academic inhibition
Pupils from modest socio­economic backgrounds choose less selective academic
tracks than others at the same level of ability. Pupils from more modest
backgrounds underestimate their own ability; they believe that they are less likely
to succeed in a selective academic track, and they have a tendency to conform to
the choices of their peers. In addition, outside influence (from the parents or
school) over the course of the last year of junior high tends to exacerbate the
gap for weaker students, but narrow the gap for stronger students. We propose
specific policy interventions based on these findings.
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Les élèves d’origine sociale modeste aspirent à des filières académiques moins
sélectives que leurs pairs de même niveau scolaire mais d’origine sociale
favorisée. Plusieurs raisons sont mises à jour : premièrement, les élèves d’origine
modeste sous­estiment leurs capacités scolaires actuelles par rapport aux élèves
d’origine favorisée ; ensuite, ils anticipent une forte différence dans leurs chances
de succès dans le futur ; en outre, ils ont tendance à se conformer à leurs pairs.
Par ailleurs, l’action des parents et des enseignants dans le processus
d’orientation tend à accroître ces inégalités d’aspirations pour les élèves faibles,
tandis qu’elle réduit ces inégalités pour les élèves au­dessus de la médiane. Ces
résultats permettent de proposer des pistes d’interventions permettant de réduire
les inégalités sociales d’aspirations scolaires.
ABSTRACT
1. Background
The degree to which socio-economic background determines academic performance
is a key policy question: how much of school performance is determined by where, and to
whom, you are born? In France, a great deal of the difference in performance on
standardized tests is explained by differences in economic and social background of the
students - more than in other OECD countries. This means that children from more modest
backgrounds may not tend to do better than their parents, and that overall income mobility
may be reduced. Such a dynamic can lock generations and social groups into a cycle of low
achievement.
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reduce or exacerbate such a tendency. The role
that the education system plays in determining
intergenerational mobility is thus important to
understand. School should provide opportunities
for all participants, rather than reinforcing socio-
economic classes. However, it may not play this
role, particularly if it supports the reproduction of
the social structure, aided by the internalization, by
the students themselves, of social attitudes about
the capabilities of people from their own
background (Bourdieu, 1966).
Inequalities in academic track choices
related to socio-economic origins in the context of
France have been analyzed by Girard and Bastide
(1963), Duru-Bellat and Mingat (1985), and
Broccolichi and Sinthon (2011). The weight of the
evidence is that, at the same level of ability, pupils
from modest backgrounds chose less selective
academic tracks after completing junior high. Yet
there is little empirical evidence that can shed light
on the mechanisms behind this phenomenon. In
particular, there is no quantitative evidence on the
extent to which differences in track choice are due
to teachers (discrimination) or to pupils
(inhibition).
This brief explains new research on this role
of academic inhibition in reinforcing socio-
economic class.
2. Description of the Data
In three regional education authorities from
the Parisian region (Créteil, Paris and Versailles),
six thousand pupils in 59 junior high schools
(roughly half of which were labeled a “Priority
Education Zone”) were interviewed at the
beginning (fall) of their final year of junior high
(see Box 1). These students were tested on their
mathematical ability, provided information on their
family origins, their preferred academic track for
the following year, as well as a self-esteem
questionnaire related to academic ability. In
addition, some of the questionnaires were framed
to measure the taste for conforming to peers, the
fear of peer rejection, and the role of social
stereotypes. To better measure the importance of
information, one group of questionnaires included
a list of available academic track options.
In addition, administrative data was
collected for the same three authorities, including
socio-economic status of the parents, the
academic track chosen after junior high school, the
score on the national end-of-junior-high exam and
information on school characteristics. Socio-
economic status is measured by the parents’
profession: a pupil is considered to come from a
high SES background if he or she has at least one
parent who has a high-SES job.
3. Findings
Pupils from more modest backgrounds
aim for less selective academic tracks than
pupils from advantaged backgrounds at the
same level of ability. When asked at the
beginning of the last year of junior high, students
from modest backgrounds are, overall 11% less
likely to report that they would prefer to follow
the GT track, controlling for grades, and are more
likely to prefer to enroll in vocational school. For
students above average, those from weaker origins
have low aspirations relative to their good grades –
they do not aim as high as they could, whereas this
is not true anymore for top students. For the
weakest students, those from more advantaged
origins have high aspirations relative to their poor
grades – they aim higher than they should.
Pupils from more modest backgrounds
end up making choices that are less selective
than pupils from advantaged backgrounds at
the same level of ability. Pupils from modest
backgrounds were 5% less likely to go to the GT
track and 74% less likely to repeat the last grade of
junior high (in an effort to gain access to the GT
track). They were, however, 93% more likely to go
to a vocational high school and 169% more likely
to go for apprenticeships. However, not all
Box 1. Academic Track Options in France
When finishing junior high in France (referred to as “troisième”, the equivalent of 9th grade in the United
States, at about 14 years old) pupils either begin the GT track (General or Technical high school) or the Vocational
track (Professional High School or Apprenticeships).
• The GT track is more selective and offers the possibility of further higher education. General high
school studies include literature, social studies & economics, and sciences.
• Technical high school includes management, industrial technology, health, laboratory science, art, life
sciences, and hospitality.
• Professional High school and Apprenticeships lead to careers in construction, sanitation, mechanics,
electrical technicians, commerce, secretaries, agriculture, and other services.
Pupils – obviously in consultation with their parents – first express their preferred track, and the school
then decides on the track that would best fit the student’s skills. If the school thinks that the pupil is not
sufficiently strong to begin the GT track, the pupil can repeat the last year of junior high and attempt to gain
access to the GT track. In one case out of two, the school’s decision is different from families’ initial choice
(DEPP, 2013). In such a case, parents can appeal the school decision to the regional education authority, and a
third of them do it. What happens is almost always that parents want their child to access the GT track, and the
appeal procedure works in 60% of the cases.
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students are affected in the same way by their
social origins. The students in the upper third of
the grade distribution (strongest pupils) generally
go to the GT track regardless of background. For
students in the middle third of the grade
distribution, students from modest origins are less
likely to go to the GT track and more likely to
vocational school or apprenticeships. For the
weakest students, from the bottom third of the
grade distribution, students from more modest
origins were less likely to repeat 9th grade in an
attempt to access the GT track, and more likely to
go for vocational school or apprenticeships.
Outside influences during the school
year (likely to be school guidance, parents, or
peers) decreased the gap for stronger pupils
and increased it for weaker pupils. There are
many outside influences that might be responsible
for differences between students’ aspirations at the
beginning of the year and actual assignment at the
end of the year, most notably the efforts of
parents and schools to guide the choices of the
pupils. For the strongest pupils, there is no change
over time. For average to stronger pupils, these
outside influences helped equalize differences in
orientations: students from modest origins were
more likely to enter the GT track, relative to their
expressed preferences at the beginning of the year.
However, outside influences for the weakest 20%
of pupils had the effect of increasing the gap
between students from modest and advantaged
backgrounds: weak pupils from advantaged
backgrounds were more likely to repeat, in an
attempt to gain access to the GT track.
Pupils believe that if they are from a
modest background, they are less likely to
succeed. All students believe that the social and
family factors (living in a poor neighborhood,
having foreign parents, having a professionally
successful family) have a large influence on the
chances of future success at a given grade level.
Whether or not this belief is correct, it can explain
3
Figure 2. Percent of pupils choosing vocational school or apprenticeships, by decile of performance on the
end-of-junior high national exam. At higher levels of performance, very few pupils choose the vocational
track, but at lower levels of performance, pupils from modes origins (red) are more likely to choose vocational
school than those from advantaged origins (blue). Pupils from advantaged origins are more likely to choose to
repeat a year in an effort to gain access to the GT track.
Figure 1. Percent of pupils actually choosing the GT track, by decile of performance on the end-of-junior
high national exam. At higher levels, there is little difference between pupils from advantaged (blue) or modest
(red) backgrounds, but from the first through seventh decile there is a significant difference.
some of the difference in academic choices relative
to socio-economic background. If this belief is
also shared by teachers and parents, it might also
explain the differences in advice that the students
get. If the belief is correct, then students may be
simply making the best trade-off between policy
choices. If it is not correct, then it may be a self-
fulfilling prophecy. The policy conclusions in each
case would be different, and further research is
needed on the subject.
Pressure from peers and a desire to
conform may sway the choices of pupils from
more modest backgrounds. Half of all pupils
stated that their academic track choice might
negatively impact their social life, either through
separation from friends, creating resentment
among friends, or inviting teasing from peers.
Students from more modest backgrounds tend to
conform to the choices of their peers, while
students from more favored backgrounds are more
willing to differentiate themselves when their peers
choose less selective tracks. We also observe that a
substantial proportion of students do not want to
tell their peers that they want to pursue a GT track
(but are willing to disclose their preferences for less
selective tracks).
Pupil’s assessment of their own ability is
strongly related to socio-economic origin:
pupils from modes backgrounds rate
themselves as less capable, even at the same
ability level. At the same grade level, pupils from
modest backgrounds rate themselves as
academically less capable than others from
privileged origins. The difference in academic self-
esteem related to socio-economic origin is not
related to the school environment, and still explains
a part of the difference in academic track choices.
Differences in academic track choices
are not explained by differences between
schools or by differences in grading practices.
The variation in the choices of academic track is
explained by differences in the home environment,
not what kind of school a pupil attends. In
particular, we observe that the gap in GT track
choice between pupils from modest backgrounds
and those from advantaged backgrounds is
4
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Figure 4. Effect of anticipating that preferences will be shared with the class on declared preferences for the
GT track, by decile of grades. A sample of pupils received a modified questionnaire that suggested their
responses would be shared with their class (red bars). They were less likely to state that they wanted to pursue
the more selective GT track than those that did not think their answers might be shared (blue bars).
Figure 3. Pupils perception of the relationship of success to family background. The figure shows the average
response to the question “What is the percent chance that a good student will be able to complete their chosen
academic track if they are...”
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observed more strongly in better-off schools
(those that are not in “Education Priority Zones”).
The gap in the rate of going to vocational schools
or apprenticeships (as opposed to repeating a year
in order to access the GT track) is observed across
all schools.
In terms of grading, at the same ability level,
pupils from modest backgrounds get slightly
higher grades than pupils from privileged
backgrounds, and this is a function of the types of
schools they are enrolled in (pupils from modest
backgrounds are more likely to be in schools with
lower overall grades). However, these differences
cannot explain the observed differences in
preferences.
Information about available options and
concerns about the cost of education do not
explain preferences about what pupils will do
immediately after junior high, but they may
explain variation in preferences about
academic choices further in the future (after
high school). Very few pupils from modest
backgrounds believe that they will face logistical or
financial difficulties in pursuing any of the options
immediately following junior high school, but 1 out
of 4 pupils indicate that at least one higher
education (post-secondary) option would force
them to borrow money. Since pupils from more
modest origins are likely to have more trouble
borrowing than those of privileged origins, this
may influence academic track choices, and indeed
differences in beliefs about the need to borrow
explain a part of the difference in preferences.
Differences in information about education
options do not explain differences in preferences
after junior high, though they do explain some of
the difference in preferences for education after
high school.
4. Policy Implications and Paths for
Future Research
The data presented here show that socio-
economic origins play an important role in the
choices that young people make about their
academic track following junior high, in part
because of academic inhibition (average and good
pupils), and in another part because of outside
influences (weak pupils). We find that academic
inhibition of pupils from modest origins is likely to
go through the mechanisms of peer pressure and
conformity on the one hand, and through pupils
underestimation of their own present and future
abilities on the other hand.
The first issue – peer pressure and
conformity – implies that programs or policies that
encourage young people to develop their own
sense of self apart from that of their group of
social origin may be beneficial. There are several
studies suggesting the effectiveness of such
programs in different contexts (for example,
Desert et al., 2009, Oyserman et al., 2006, and
Croizet et al., 2004). Piloting such a project in
France might be a low cost and high return public
policy investment.
The second issue – lower estimation of
ability and lower expectations of success for pupils
from more modest backgrounds – must be
addressed carefully. There is evidence that pupils
entering secondary from modest backgrounds
perform worse than pupils from more favored
backgrounds, even if they have similar initial levels
of achievement. This may be because there is less
support at home. The public policy implication of
this is to increase support – tutoring, advice – for
pupils from modest backgrounds entering the GT
track. Over time, such an investment may change
Figure 5. Self-perception of School Proficiency. Pupils whose parents did not have a high school degree
(red line) systematically rated their own proficiency at school lower than pupils with at least one parent with a
high school degree, controlling for actual academic ability.
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the rate of success and thus change the
expectation of success that currently reduces
academic ambition. Moreover, the lower
performances of pupils from modest background
in high school might be the consequence of lower
expectations of success, discouragement resulting
in lower effort, lower investment and lower
motivation. Programs enhancing the sense of self-
efficacy and dedication (for example one like in
Lent, 2008) might thus also help to change
expectations and reduce the gap associated with
socio-economic origins.
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